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COMMENTS 
Illegal Acts and the Discretionary Function 
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
Between 1953 and 1973 the Central Intelligence Agency 
opened without warrants approximately 215,000 letters passing 
through New York City to and from the Soviet Union.' Code- 
named HTLINGUAL or SRPOINTER, the surveillance project 
initially involved only the exterior examination of  envelope^,^ but 
eventually was expanded to include opening letters and photo- 
graphing their contents for subsequent analysis and distribution 
at CIA  headquarter^.^ Copies of more than 57,000 letters were 
given to the FBI.4 A substantial number of the letters were opened 
pursuant to "watch lists" compiled from names submitted by 
various divisions of the CIA and the FBI.5 The other letters were 
opened at random. 
In response to public disclosure of the CIA project, several 
suitsfi have been filed against the United States under the Federal 
1. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT O INTELLI- 
GENCE ACTIVITIES, UPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK 111, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 565, 567 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 SELECT COMMIT~EE R PORT]. 
2, COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT 102-03 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CIA COMMISSION REPORT]; 1976 SELECT 
COMMITTEE R PORT, supra note 1, a t  567-69. 
3. CIA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 105-06; 1976 SELECT COMMITTEE R PORT, 
supra note 1, at 569-72. 
4. 1976 SELECT C O M M ~ E E  REPORT, supra note 1, a t  567. 
5. One estimate is that the watch list accounted for 25% of the openings. Id. at 573. 
In the last year of operation, 5,000 of the 8,700 openings were based on the watch list. CIA 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, a t  111. On the average the list included 300 names, of 
which about 100 were supplied by the FBI. Id. at  105-06. The watch list "originated with 
a relatively few names which might reasonably be expected to lead to genuine foreign 
intelligence or counterintelligence information, but soon expanded well beyond the initial 
guidelines into the area of essentially domestic intelligence." 1976 SELECT COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 1, at 574. At times the watch list included domestic peace organiza- 
tions, political activists, scientific organizations, authors such as Edward Albee and John 
Steinbeck, and others. Id. When the project was finally terminated, the watch list con- 
tained about 600 names. CIA COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 112; 1976 SELECT 
COMMITTEE R PORT, supra note 1, a t  573. 
6. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Avery v. 
United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Cmikshank v. United States, 431 F. 
Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977); Hardy v. United States, No. 76-1423 (D.D.C. Feb. 14,1977); 
Siebel v. United States, No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976); Murphy v. CIA, No. 76- 
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Tort Claims Act (FTCA) seeking damages for unauthorized in- 
trusions on privacy and constitutional rights. Reaction by the 
courts has varied: three suits have been dismissed,' motions to 
dismiss have been denied in two  action^,^ and one judge has 
awarded damages to several plaintiffs? A fundamental issue in 
these cases is the applicability of the discretionary function ex- 
ception of the FTCA1° to the CIA activities. Resolution of this 
important issue depends on the extent to which the exception 
protects acts of a discretionary nature which violate the law or the 
Constitution. 
Prior to passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal 
government could not be sued in tort because of its sovereign 
immunity. This sovereign immunity is believed to be a carryover 
from the common law notion that "the King can do no wrong."ll 
Immunity for the federal government was first recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court in dicta without explanation in 
1821,12 and has been interpreted to mean that the United States 
may not be sued without the consent of the Legislature.13 Con- 
gress waived the government's immunity from contract actions in 
the nineteenth century,14 and in the early twentieth century gave 
limited consent to be sued in admiralty15 and patent actions.16 
Tort immunity was retained until 1946, when in response to the 
12 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1976). Another suit based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970) and 5 
U.S.C. §§  701-706 (1970) rather than the FTCA was dismissed as against the United 
States because the statutes relied upon did not explicitly waive sovereign immunity for 
this kind of situation. Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 867-70 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
7. Hardy v. United States, No. 76-1423 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977); Siebel v. United 
States, No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976); Murphy v. CIA, No. 76-12 (N.D. Iowa May 
28, 1976). 
8. Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United 
States, 431 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
9. See Wilson v. United States, No. 77-975 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1978); Birnbaum v. 
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
lo. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). 
11. See James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 610, 611-15 (1955). 
12. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). 
13. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,399 (1976); see United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
14. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1491 (Supp. V 1975)). 
15. Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, 4 2, 41 Stat. 525 (current version at  46 U.S.C. § 742 
(1970)). 
16. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 423, 36 Stat. 851 (current version at  28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) 
(1970)). 
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large number of private relief bills being pressed upon the Con- 
gress,17 the FTCA was enactedlR to grant the district courts juris- 
diction to hear complaints arising from negligent or wrongful acts 
of government workers acting within the scope of their employ- 
ment. lg 
Within the legislation, Congress retained governmental 
immunity in certain important respects.20 The most important of 
these is the discretionary function exception, section 2680(a) of 
the Act, which specifically exempts the government from liability 
for: 
[alny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a stat- 
ute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.21 
Thus, the government may not be sued for injuries resulting from 
the administration with due care of any statute or regulation or 
from the exercise of discretionary functions, even though that 
discretion "be abused." 
The phrase "discretionary function,". however, is nowhere 
defined in the Act, and the statutory language does not specify 
the extent to which illegal acts of a discretionary nature are to be 
protected by immunity. The report of the House Committee on 
the J u d i ~ i a r y ~ ~  accompanying the Act and the Supreme Court 
decision in Dalehite v. United States23 help illustrate the coverage 
of the discretionary function exception, but they do not deal di- 
rectly with its relation to illegal activities. The applicability of 
the exception to illegal acts was an incidental issue in Hatahley 
v. United States,24 but the decision's precedential value may be 
questioned. 
17. H.R. REP. NO. 1287,79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 1400, 
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1946). 
. Ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1942) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
28 U.S.C. 8 1346(b) (1970). 
Id. 8 2680 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). 
Id. 8 2680(a) (1970). 
H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 
346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
351 U.S. 173 (1956). 
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A. Congressional Intent 
The report of the House Committee on the Judiciaryz5 indi- 
cates some of the kinds of activities section 2680(a) was intended 
to protect, but it is not extremely helpful in determining the 
extent to which discretionary immunity protects illegal acts. In 
explaining the scope of this "highly important exception," the 
committee reported that section 2680(a) was intended to preclude 
the possibility of suit for damages against the government 
"growing out of an authorized activity . . . where . . . the only 
ground for suit is the contention that the same conduct by a 
private individual would be tortious, or that the statute or regula- 
tion authorizing the project was invalid."26 The exception was to 
immunize the government from suits based on abuses of discre- 
tionary authority by regulatory agencies such as the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or 
the Treasury, "whether or not negligence is alleged to have been 
in~olved."~' Since all the activities discussed by the committee 
are legal, an argument could be made that by negative implica- 
tion illegal activities are outside the exception.28 On the other 
hand, the policy manifest in the first portion of section 
2680(a)-that the legality and constitutionality of statutes and 
regulations not be tested through tort a c t i ~ n ~ ~ - m a y  also apply to 
discretionary activities as well.30 The committee reported that the 
Act was "not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the 
validity of or provide a remedy on account of such discretionary 
acts even though negligently performed and involving an abuse 
of di~cretion."~' This language may indicate that even illegal dis- 
cretionary aets are protected by section 2680(a) as "an abuse of 
discretion." 
Thus, while some language of the committee report implies 
that discretionary immunity protects illegal acts of a discretion- 
ary nature, other language seems to indicate that it does not. 
Because the language of the committee report allows for two in- 
terpretations of the relation of the discretionary function excep- 
tion to illegal acts, it does not resolve the issue. 
25. H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). 
26. Id. at 5. 
27. Id. at 5-6. 
28. See Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 973 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
29. H.R. REP NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945); S. REP. NO. 1400, 79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 33 (1946). 
30. See Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant United States a t  27-29, Birnbaum v. 
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
31. H.R. REP. NO. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945). 
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B. Dalehite v. United States 
The first significant judicial interpretation of the discretion- 
ary function exception came in Dalehite v. United States32 in 
1953. Although the decision does not deal directly with illegal acts 
of a discretionary nature, it provides useful guidelines for apply- 
ing section 2680(a). In Dalehite, a quantity of flammable fertilizer 
was stored on some ships near Texas City, Texas, in accordance 
with government plans to ship the nitrogen-based fertilizer to 
occupied countries after World War 11. The fertilizer ignited and 
the ensuing blazes and explosions claimed many lives and caused 
extensive property damage.33 Ruling on the applicability of sec- 
tion 2680(a) of the FTCA in a suit following the disaster, the 
Supreme Court held that the loading and storage procedures and 
activities arose out of the performance of discretionary func- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  The allegedly negligent acts-pertaining to bagging tem- 
perature, packaging, labeling, and the chemical coating of the 
fertilizer-were found to have been "performed under the direc- 
tion of a plan developed a t  a high level under the direct delegation 
of plan-making authority from the apex of the Executive Depart- 
ment."3J After explaining that these acts were within the excep- 
tion because discretion includes "determinations made by execu- 
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or 
schedules of operations," the Court concluded: "Where there is 
room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.';36 
The Court's observation that the decisions regarding storage 
procedures were "responsibly made a t  a planning rather than 
operational level"37 has led to to the adoption of a planning level- 
operational level test by many lower courts. Under the test, deci- 
sions made a t  a planning level are protected by section 2680(a), 
while those made in implementation of existing plans are opera- 
tional level decisions not within the exception.38 The test has been 
criticized for its undue reliance on the rank of the decisionmaker 
rather than on the nature of the decision." Several variants have 
32. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
33. Id. at 17-23. 
34. Id. at 37-42. 
35. Id. at 39-40. 
36. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. at 42. 
38. Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975); Ward v. United 
States, 471 F.2d 66, 670 (3d Cir. 1973); see Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 811 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). 
39. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,996-97 (6th Cir. 1975); L. JAYSON, 
HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS 4 249.07, at 12-134 to -140 (1978); Comment, 
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been suggested by  commentator^,^^ and one court has ruled that 
the rank of the official is not determinative and that the essential 
issue is whether the decision involves the formulation of govern- 
ment policy.'' 
In some cases involving illegal government activities, the 
issue of discretionary immunity may be disposed of through the 
planning level-operational level test or one of its variations, with- 
out any need to consider the applicability of section 2680(a) to 
illegal acts. Such is the case when the illegal act takes place a t  
an operational level, where immunity would not exist in any 
event. But the fact that a decision was made a t  a planning level 
and involved discretion in the formulation of government policy 
does not necessarily mean that immunity is appropriate. Where 
a planning level decision is made to engage in acts violating the 
law or Constitution, policy may dictate that the discretionary 
function exception not apply. 
C. Hatahley v. United States 
The applicability of the discretionary function exception to 
illegal acts was an incidental issue in Hatahley u. United States,'* 
where horses and burros belonging to some Navajo Indian fami- 
lies had been rounded up by federal officials and sold or de- 
stroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Utah abandoned horse 
statute.43 There was evidence that the statute was applied dis- 
Discretionary Function Exception to Federal Tort Liability, 2 CUM.-SAM. L REV. 383,397- 
401 (1971); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational 
Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 170, 181-89 (1976). But see Reynolds, The Discretionary 
Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81, 125-32 (1968). 
40. E.g., Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discre- 
tionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1956); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: 
A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational Level Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 170, 190-97 
(1976); see Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793-94, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 
248 (1968); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 25.03, at 477-79 (1972); Note, Separation 
of Powers and the Discretionary Function Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation 
Against the Government, 56 IOWA L. REV. 930,975-83 (1971); Comment, The Discretionary 
Function Exception to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 168-85 (1977). 
41. Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,997 (6th Cir. 1975). Recent trends indicate 
that more emphasis is being placed on the type of decision rather than on the rank of the 
decisionmaker, even in cases purportedly following the planning level-operational level 
test. Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Exception 
Revisited, 31 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 161 (1976). However, since most policy decisions are made 
by high-level administrators, the test suggested in Downs may differ from the planning 
level-operational level test only in form. To the extent it  does differ, it may unduly narrow 
the exception by removing immunity for "routine" decisions made by planning level 
officials. See 56 B.U.L. REV. 815, 822-24 (1976). 
42. 351 U.S. 173 (1956). 
43. UTAH CODE ANN. § § 47-2-1 to -7 (1953). 
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criminatorily against the Indians to force them to leave land for 
which white livestock owners had been granted permits." In sus- 
taining a district court judgment holding the government liable 
for damages, the Supreme Court found that the Utah abandoned 
horse statute had not been properly invoked and that the federal 
agents had not complied with applicable federal  regulation^.'^ 
In its defense, the government argued that if the roundup 
was illegal and unauthorized, it would be outside the scope of the 
agents' employment and the United States would not be liable. 
Alternatively, if the roundup was authorized, official immunity 
should protect the federal agents from liability for their mistake 
of law, and in turn the discretionary function exception should 
protect the government to the same extent." The Court rejected 
the first part of the argument, observing that the acts complained 
of fell in that narrow area "in which a government agent, like a 
private agent, can act beyond his actual authority and yet within 
the scope of his empl~yment ."~~ As to the second portion of the 
argument, the Court stated, "We are here not concerned with any 
problem of a 'discretionary function' under the Act. These acts 
were wrongful trespasses not involving discretion on the part of 
the agents . . . . "48 
Although the Court did not elaborate its reasons for finding 
that the roundup did not involve discretion on the part of the 
agents, two explanations are possible. One is that the decision 
made by the range manager to gather the horses in an improper 
way was made at  an operational rather than at a planning level. 
Regulations specifically provided the manner in which federal 
agents could invoke state statutes to deal with unlawful grazing. 
Since the failure to provide the adequate written notice required 
by regulation was an error made in the implementation of estab- 
lished procedures, it was arguably made at  an operational level 
and therefore not protected by the discretionary function excep- 
tion." A second explanation, suggested by recent cases, is that for 
44. 351 U S .  at 175-76. 
45. Id. at 177-80. 
46. Brief for the United States at 45-57; see Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8-11. 
47. 351 U S .  at 181. 
48. Id. (citation omitted). 
49. See Harris & Schnepper, supra note 41, at 174 (failure to follow guidelines as 
operational activity); see also Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,997-98 (6th Cir. 1975) 
(FBI agent who did not comply with FBI hijacking guidelines was not setting policy, 
discretionary immunity not applicable); 56 B.U.L. REV. 815, 821-22 (1976). The first part 
of 6 2680(a), precluding claims based on the execution of a statute or regulation with due 
care, did not apply in Hatahley since "'[d]ue care' implies at least some minimal concern 
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policy reasons an administrator should not be regarded as having 
discretion to disobey mandatory regulatory commands.50 Such a 
decision should be considered as outside the agent's discretion, 
even if made at  a planning level. In that sense, then, section 
2680(a) would not apply because the action of the federal agents 
in Hatahley would be viewed as involving disobedience-not dis- 
cretion. 
Hatahley 's rejection, therefore, of discretionary immunity 
may have been based either on a planning level-operational level 
descriptive analysis or on a policy judgment that illegal acts 
should not come within the ambit of section 2680(a). Because i t  
is not clear on which ground the discretionary function exception 
was found inapplicable, the case should not be considered as a 
controlling precedent. 
In this absence of definitive precedent, the lower courts have 
generally taken one of two positions regarding illegal acts and 
discretionary immunity. The positions are: (1) that illegal acts 
represent abuses of discretion which come within the immunity 
provided by section 2680(a), or (2) that illegal acts are completely 
outside the exception because the government cannot have any 
discretion to violate the law. A third position, which has not been 
explicitly adopted by any court to date, is that clearly illegal acts 
are outside the exception, but those falling in a gray area of uncer- 
tain legality should be protected by either an absolute or a quali- 
fied immunity. 
A. Illegal Acts as an Abuse of Discretion Protected by Section 
2680(a) 
In Kiiskila v. Nichols (Kiiskila I),51 the Seventh Circuit held 
that  an Army commander had violated the first amendment 
rights of a civilian employee by excluding her from the Army base 
where she worked. Prior to the exclusion order a quantity of anti- 
war literature had been found in the trunk of the woman's car 
while she was entering the base; she had previously mentioned an 
antiwar demonstration to a soldier on the base during a casual 
for the rights of others. Here, the agents proceeded with complete disregard for the prop- 
erty rights of the petitioners." 351 U.S. at 181. 
50. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252, 1261 (2d 
Cir. 1975); Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Avery v. 
United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D. Conn. 1977); Cruikshank v. United States, 431 
F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
51. 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970). 
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conversation; and she had recently distributed leaflets near a 
naval station.52 In view of this behavior, the officer concluded that 
the woman would probably attempt to distribute literature on the 
post in violation of a base regulation prohibiting demonstrations, 
sit-ins, and similar a c t i v i t i e ~ . ~ ~  The court of appeals held that the 
worker had not violated the regulation and that in the absence 
of any "overwhelming countervailing state" interests peculiar to 
her job, the exclusion from the base and concomitant loss of her 
job were violative of the first amendment.54 
On remand, the district court issued an order enjoining the 
commander from barring the civilian worker from the base. The 
former employee then amended her complaint to seek $150,000 
damages from the United States.55 The district court's dismissal 
of the damage claim was affirmed by the court of appeals in 
Kiiskila v. United States (Kiiskila 11)56 on the basis of the discre- 
tionary function exception. The court observed that the com- 
mander possessed "wide, though constitutionally limited author- 
ity to exclude . . . persons inimical to security, discipline and 
m~rale."~' Although the officer may have "through negligence or 
wrongful exercise . . . abused his discretion by enforcing the reg- 
ulation [regarding demonstrations and similar activities] 
against activity 'too far removed in terms of both distance and 
time' . . . to pass constitutional muster," the government re- 
mained immune because of the discretionary function excep- 
tion." On these facts it was held that even a "constitutionally 
repugnant" exclusion order was merely an abuse of discretion 
protected by the discretionary function exception." 
While not citing Kiiskila II, a district court in Siebel u. 
United StatesM reached basically the same conclusion in dismiss- 
ing an action based on the CIA mail project. Admitting that "the 
mail intercept activity complained of here might very well have 
been unlawful if conducted by private persons," the court rea- 
soned that: 
52. Id. at 746. 
53. Id. at 746-47. 
54. Id. at 748-51. 
55. Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 627 (7th Cir. 1972). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 628. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 627-28. Significantly, the court did not rule that one injured by unconstitu- 
tional excesses of discretionary authority is without remedy; it held only that pecuniary 
relief was unavailable. Kiiskila I indicates that injunctive relief is clearly allowable. 433 
F.2d at 751. 
60. No. 76-1737 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976). 
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this in itself does not subject the United States to civil liability. 
The FTCA exempts the United States from liability for discre- 
tionary acts performed by its employees, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused. The discretionary acts com- 
plained of here might have involved an abuse of discretion. Nev- 
ertheless, the United States has not waived its sovereign im- 
munity with respect to these acts.61 
Similarly, both Hardy v.  United Statesa2 and Murphy v. CIAa3 
indicated that the CIA intrusions complained of fell within the 
discretionary function exception, and the actions were dismissed. 
These cases would indicate, on their facts, that illegal acts 
of a discretionary nature are abuses of discretion within the pro- 
tection of section 268O(a). Carried to its extreme, this interpreta- 
tion would immunize any governmental decision which was 
shown to be of a discretionary nature by virtue of a planning 
level-operational level type of analysis. The legality of a decision 
would be taken into consideration only to the extent it affected 
the application of this test. The government would be liable only 
for those torts caused by operational level decisions; recourse for 
injuries from illegal discretionary acts would be limited to injunc- 
tive relief and private relief bills submitted to Congresd4 
B. Illegal Acts as Outside the Discretionary Function Exception 
While Kiiskila II and Siebel hold that acts exceeding an offi- 
cial's authority are an abuse of discretion protected by section 
2680(a), another series of cases places such acts outside the dis- 
cretionary function exception. These cases hold that an official's 
authority is limited by applicable regulations, statutes, and con- 
stitutional provisions. Any decision in violation thereof is outside 
an official's authority or discretion-not merely an abuse of dis- 
cretion-and therefore not protected by section 2680(a). 
A case in which the due process clause of the Constitution 
and pertinent postal regulations were arguably violated is Myers 
& Myers, Inc. v.  United States Postal S e r v i ~ e , ~ ~  where a corpora- 
tion brought a suit against the Postal Service for negligently re- 
61. Id. slip op. at 4. 
62. No. 76-1423, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1977). 
63. No. 76-12, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Iowa May 28, 1976) (dictum). 
64. See Post-Trial Memorandum of Defendant United States at 27, Birnbaum v. 
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 258 (1965); Developments in the Law-Remedies Against the 
United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REV. 827, 892-93 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 
Remedies Against the United States]. 
65. 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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fusing to renew six contracts for the transportation of mail be- 
tween post offices? Facts were alleged to show that the action 
was part of a sanction taken against the company for purported 
irregularities in operating  procedure^.^^ The lower court dismissed 
the action, holding that the decision not to renew the contracts 
was a discretionary act under section 2680(a) of the FTCA? The 
appellate court agreed that the refusal to renew the contracts was 
within the discretionary function e x c e p t i ~ n , ~ ~  but ruled that the 
denial of prior notice and a hearing was not.70 
The court observed that the Postal Service's refusal to renew 
the contracts under the circumstances may have amounted to a 
long term de facto debarment of the transportation company,71 
and that in such a case due process and applicable postal regula- 
tions would require notice and an opportunity to be heard.72 The 
court also found that the government's failure to grant a hearing 
or notice could constitute a wrongful act within the meaning of 
the FTCA, and that discretionary immunity would not apply to 
it.73 
[Hlere the appellants' argument is that the Postal Service has 
acted in contravention of its own regulations, if not unconstitu- 
tionally, in denying appellants a hearing prior to debarment 
from government contracting. It is, of course, a tautology that 
a federal official cannot have discretion to behave unconstitu- 
tionally or outside the scope of his delegated authority.74 
Thus, while section 2680(a) protected the government's final de- 
cision regarding the contract renewal, it did not protect irregular- 
ities in the decisionmaking procedure that violated postal regula- 
tions and due process requirements. 
A similar analysis was used in DeBonis v. United States,75 a 
pre-Dalehite decision in which a district court dealt in dicta with 
the applicability of discretionary immunity to fourth amendment 
violations. The opinion observed that section 2680(a) protection 
would not apply to the illegal seizure of a vehicle without a war- 
rant. "Under the circumstances [the agents] did not have any 
66. Id. at 1253-54. 
67. Id. at 1254-55, 1258. 
68. Id. at 1253-54. 
69. Id. at 1256-57. 
70. Id. at 1261. 
71. Id. at 1255, 1258. 
72. Id. at 1258-60. 
73. Id. at 1260-61. 
74. Id. at 1261. 
75. 103 F. Supp. 123 (W.D. Pa. 1952). 
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discretion in this operation,-it was their obligation and duty to 
comply with the mandate of the fourth amendment and procure 
a search warrant before entering upon the premises of a private 
citizen."76 The case was dismissed on other grounds.77 
A similar approach was followed in Griffin v.  United States,78 
a case dealing with injuries resulting from the release of polio 
vaccine that did not meet regulatory standards. After rejecting 
the government's argument that the decision to approve the par- 
ticular lot of vaccine involved sufficient policy considerations to 
bring it within section 2680(a), the court stated: 
Even were we to concede that discretion was otherwise conferred 
upon DBS [the Division of Biologic Standards] by the regula- 
tion, no discretion was conferred to disregard the mandatory 
regulatory command. In discounting test results that were re- 
quired to be considered significant, DBS acted outside the scope 
of the authority conferred by the regulation. The violation of a 
nondiscretionary command takes what otherwise might be char- 
acterized as a "discretionary function" outside the scope of the 
statutory exception.79 
The CIA mail-opening cases present a situation in which the 
first and fourth amendments as well as certain criminal statutes 
were allegedly violated. Three decisions, A very v .  United States, 
Cruikshank v .  United States, 81 and Birnbaurn v.  United States, 82 
have held that the discretionary function exception does not pro- 
tect the decision to open mail without warrants. 
Citing Myers and Hatahley, the district court in Avery v.  
United States denied a motion to dismiss, finding the decision to 
open mail, although "made at a high enough policy level so as to 
ordinarily come within the ambit of § 2680(a)," to be outside the 
exception. 
[Tlhere is a difference between abuse of discretion and lack of 
discretion. An official who abuses his discretion, by acting arbi- 
trarily or discriminatorily, for example, will be protected by 9 
2680(a). But an official with no discretion in a particular area 
has no discretion to abuse; he can only act in excess of his 
a ~ t h o r i t y . ~  
Id. at 125-26. 
Id. at 126-28. 
500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Id. at 1068-69. 
434 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 (D. Conn. 1977). 
431 F. Supp. 1355, 1358-59 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
436 F. Supp. 967, 973-74 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
434 F. Supp. at 944. 
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A motion to dismiss was similarly denied in Cruikshank v. 
United States. The district court reasoned: 
[Ilf this country has learned nothing else in the past decade, 
it has learned that no man, nor any man acting on behalf of our 
government, is above the law. The Government should not have 
the "discretion" to commit illegal acts whenever it pleases. In 
this area, there should be no policy option.84 
Relying on Avery, Myers, and Hatahley in its decision grant- 
ing judgment to the plaintiffs, the court in Birnbaum u. United 
States concluded: 
The decision to conduct an intelligence operation by meth- 
ods which violate the Constitution of the United States and 
which also probably violate several federal statutes is not discre- 
tionary in the same sense that the decision to fly a supersonic 
plane over land or to produce a potentially explosive fertilizer 
might be. There is no evidence that Congress intended this ex- 
ception to do more than free the operations of government from 
excessive concern over the untoward, and often unexpected, re- 
sults of legitimate activity conducted in the public interest. 
There is no discretion under our system to conceive, plan 
and execute an illegal program.85 
Under the analysis of these cases, the discretionary function 
exception does not apply unless a decision both meets the plan- 
ning level-operational level test or a variantg6 and does not violate 
any regulation, statute, or constitutional provision. Discretionary 
immunity, then, would automatically be waived whenever a gov- 
ernment decision violated the law. 
C. Immunity for Acts in the Gray Area of Uncertain Legality 
Because the demarcation of constitutional, statutory, and 
regulatory limits on discretionary authority is not always clear, 
and factual issues on which jurisdiction or authority depends are 
often not easily resolved, the two categorical approaches dis- 
cussed above are not always satisfactory. While not all policy 
decisions to commit illegal acts should be protected as is the case 
with the Kiiskila I1 approach, neither should all such decisions 
result in loss of immunity as dictated by the Myers approach. 
Where decisions fall within a gray area of legal uncertainty, the 
government should still be allowed some protection from liabil- 
84. 431 F. Supp. at 1359. 
85. 436 F. Supp. at 973-74. 
86. See Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 943-44 (D. Conn. 1977). 
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ity. Two basic approaches are available to provide this protec- 
tion. A purely objective approach would exclude clear violations 
of the Constitution and the law from the ambit of section 2680 
(a), but include within the immunity discretionary acts that are 
arguably legal. A second approach would provide only qualified 
immunity for such discretionary acts, dependent on the officer's 
good faith belief or motives. 
1 .  An arguable legality test 
In applying the arguable legality test to illegal acts of a dis- 
cretionary nature, a court would consider only the objective rea- 
sonableness of the official's determination that an act was or 
could be considered legal. The officer's subjective motivations 
and beliefs would not be relevant to application of the discretion- 
ary function exception under this test. The discretion protected 
by section 2680(a) would simply be defined to include the power 
of an administrator to reasonably interpret the law limiting his 
authority. 
The arguable legality test has a partial analogy in the com- 
mon law immunities and defenses available to public officials 
when sued individually. Public officers are generally granted per- 
sonal immunity from suit for decisions made within the scope of 
their a~thor i ty .~ '  The immunity protects errors of fact as well as 
of law? However, 
all officers, including judges, are liable if they act wholly outside 
of their jurisdiction or official authority, even where the act is a 
discretionary one . . . . [But a] further refinement 
[distinguishes] acts which are merely "in excess" of the juris- 
diction or authority-meaning that they are within the scope of 
the general subject-matter over which the officer has power, 
although he is without jurisdiction in the particular case. As to 
such acts there is immunity . . . . [Tlhe determination of 
facts which do or do not give him jurisdiction or authority . . . 
is obviously a judicial or discretionary function.8B 
87. Ban v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-76 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498- 
99 (1896); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1342-46 (2d Cir. 1972); 
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
OF THE SEVENTIES 8 26.00-2, at 580 (1976) (supplementing ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE); 
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.10, at 1642-43 (1956); W. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 8 132, a t  987-92 (4th ed. 1971); Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 218 (1963). 
88. See Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 138 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 
(1938); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 266 (1880). 
89. W. PROSSER, supra note 87, 8 132, at 991 (footnotes omitted). 
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Another commentator has reasoned, 
[Ilf the officer acts clearly outside the authority conferred on 
him by statute, regulation or process, he is liable for the inju- 
rious consequences of his conduct . . . . But the notion today 
is recognized that an officer generally has the duty and the 
power to determine . . . even mistakenly that he has jurisdic- 
tion-unless the facts and the law are so clear as not to present 
an issue challenging "judicial inquiry."g0 
While the interests protected by the personal immunity of 
officials are not identical to those protected by governmental 
imrn~nity,~'  they are sufficiently similarg2 that it could be argued 
the federal government should not have to pay each time an 
employee misinterprets his authority where the law is unclear.93 
The result in Kiiskila 11 conforms with an "arguable legality" 
test as applied to section 2680(a). There the commander's order 
barring the civilian employee from the Army base because of her 
antiwar activities withstood attack at the district and appellate 
court levels.94 Only when the appeal was heard en banc was the 
lower court reversed and the order of exclusion found to be uncon- 
stitutional? In the subsequent damage action, the fact that the 
order was not obviously in violation of the Constitution may have 
been a factor in the finding that the order was protected by the 
discretionary function exception. If the commander's act had 
been more blatantly unconstitutional, perhaps the district and 
appellate courts would not have been so willing to apply section 
268O(a). 
The arguable legality test can also be applied to the facts in 
Myers where there were indications that the Postal Service's re- 
fusal to renew the contracts with the transportation company was 
part of a sanction taken against it for purported, but later dis- 
proven, irregularities in business procedures. If the facts alleged 
90. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 87, Q 29.10, a t  1643 (emphasis added). See 
Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564,575 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483,498 (1896); Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1343-45 (2d Cir. 1972); Jaffe, supra note 
87, at 218; Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834-35. 
91. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352, 358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
240, 246-48 (1968); James, supra note 11, a t  651-55; Note, The Discretionary Function 
Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 125-26 (1951). 
92. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U S .  15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting); 
Jaffe, supra note 87, a t  224; James, supra note 11, at 651-52; Reynolds, supra note 39, at 
121-23. 
93. E.g., Brief for United States at 50-51, 53, Hatahley v. United States, 351 US. 
173 (1955). 
94. Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d at 746. 
95. Id. 
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by the company were true, it seems fairly clear that the nonre- 
newals were part of a de facto debarment,g6 and in such a case 
regulations plainly required prior notice and a hearing. Failure to 
provide notice and a hearing was clearly a violation of applicable 
regulations, and imposition of liability was thus consistent with 
the arguable legality test. 
The CIA cases can also be rationalized with the arguable 
legality test, with the conflicting results being attributable to a 
difference of opinion as to how "arguably legal" the mail-opening 
operation was a t  the  time. I t  could be that  Birnbaum, 
Cruikshank, and Avery reflect a belief that the CIA activities 
were clearly illegal and thus outside section 2680(a), and that 
Siebel, Murphy, and Hardy represent a belief that the project was 
merely of questionable legality at the time, but still worthy of 
immunization. Language from Siebel that "the mail intercept 
activity complained of here might very well have been unlawful 
if conducted by private personsvg7 may provide some support for 
this interpretation. Although applicable criminal statutes and 
constitutional provisions seem to indicate that the project was 
illegal,gR there is still room for a difference of opinion over whether 
it was clearly illegal a t  the time? 
2. A qualified good faith defense or immunity 
A qualified good faith immunity or defense comparable to 
that granted certain officials in section 1983100 and Bivens civil 
rights actionslOl could also be made applicable to the government 
96. See note 71 and accompanying text supra. 
97. Siebel v. United States, No. 76-1737, slip op. a t  4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 1976) 
(emphasis added). 
98. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. a t  972; CIA COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 2, a t  115. 
99. In Birnbaum, the government maintained that a sound argument could be made 
that a t  the time the mgil openings occurred they were legal. I t  refrained from doing so in 
the interest of deterring future violations. Memorandum of United States in Support of 
its Renewed Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Liability of the United States a t  3. 
100. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1970): 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus- 
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action a t  law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress. 
101. A federal cause of action to recover damages for the deprivation of constitutional 
rights by government officers created by the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of 
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in areas of unclear legality.lo2 In Scheuer v. Rh~des,'~"he Su- 
preme Court held that in section 1983 actions for deprivations of 
constitutional rights under color of state authority, officials are 
granted qualified immunity in varying degrees 
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of 
the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared 
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. 
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at 
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with 
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of 
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official 
conduct. lo4 
In the subsequently decided cases of Wood v. S t r i ~ k l a n d ~ ~ ~  
and O'Connor v. D o n a l d s ~ n ~ ~ ~  the Court may have slightly modi- 
fied the standard,lo7 holding that the relevant question is whether 
a state official 
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took 
within the sphere of official responsibility would violate the con- 
stitutional rights of the [person] affected, or if he took the 
action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of 
[clearly established] constitutional rights or other injury to the 
, [person]. '08 
An analogous qualified good faith immunity as applied to 
governmental tort liability would turn on two elements: (1) the 
existence of a good faith belief in the legality of the decision 
made, and (2) the reasonableness of that belief.log Thus, applica- 
a Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531 (1977). 
102. The court noted in Cruikshank that "[wlhether or not the government should 
be liable for illegal acts carried out by employees acting in good faith is not an issue before 
the court a t  this time." 431 F. Supp. a t  1357 n.5. Perhaps if a good faith defense had been 
advanced, the outcome would have been more favorable to  the government. However, 
there are indications that the actions in fact were not taken in good faith. See CIA 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, a t  107; 1976 SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, 
at  608-11. 
103. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 
104. Id. at 247-48. 
105. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). 
106. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
107. See Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855,864-66 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1976); K. 
DAVIS, supra note 87, $ 26.00, a t  574-76. 
108. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. a t  322; see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. a t  
577. For an example of a constitutional right not clearly established at  the time of the 
offense, see Procunier v. Navarette, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978). 
109. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972); 
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tion of the good faith test would be similar to that of the arguable 
legality test, with an additional subjective consideration of actual 
belief or motive. 
IV. POLICY 
In deciding which of the three principal approaches should 
be used in cases involving illegal acts of a discretionary nature, 
four basic policy reasons behind section 2680(a) must be consid- 
ered. First, the discretionary function exception is said to pro- 
mote the separation of powers by preventing undue judicial inter- 
ference with executive decisions. Second, preventing imposition 
of liability is viewed as promoting zealous performance of duties 
and responsibilities by government officials. Third, courts are 
said to be ill equipped to "second-guess" discretionary policy 
decisions made by the executive branch. Finally, it has been sug- 
gested that discretionary immunity helps avoid the "enormous 
and unpredictable liability which could result from judicial re- 
examination of major executive and legislative decisions."110 
A. Guarding the  Separation of  Powers 
Providing immunity for discretionary acts helps promote the 
independence of the judicial and executive branches of govern- 
ment. Where an official has been given authority to weigh com- 
peting policy considerations and make quasi-judicial or quasi- 
legislative decisions, Congress has indicated "its desire that final 
decision-making power and responsibility rest in that official."ll1 
Decisions by such officials should be subject to the test of the 
ballot box, directly or indirectly, and not to the courts' reasonable 
man test.li2 If decisions are subject to review through tort cases, 
officials will "start acting with one eye to possible court question- 
ing, resulting in the loss of much of their independence, regardless 
of the fact that they cannot be held personally liable."l13 To avoid 
Lehmann, supra note 101, at 590-91. For a criticism of the good faith standard set forth 
in Bivens,  see Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to Suits for Police Deprivations of  
Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975). 
110. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122 (quoting Comment, California Tort Claims Act: 
Discretionary Immunity, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 470, 471 (1966)). 
111. Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 892; see Downs v. United 
States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975). 
112. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 
YALE L.J. 534, 544-45 & n.70 (1947). But  see Note, T h e  Discretionary Function Exception 
of the  Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 126 (1951). 
113. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121. See also Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793- 
94, 447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968). 
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such a result, the judiciary is reluctant "to review the propriety 
of actions which under our form of government are committed to 
the co-ordinate branches of that government,"l14 and even in the 
absence of section 2680(a), it is likely that a discretionary func- 
tion exception would be judicially created.l15 Judicial review by 
appeal from administrative determinations may sometimes affect 
decisions otherwise protected by the exception, but with its at-  
tendant procedural safeguards, such review does not involve the 
same cost or degree of judicial interference as do tort actions.l16 
The Kiiskila II approach, that illegal discretionary acts are 
considered an abuse of discretion protected by section 2680(a), 
would further this objective by disallowing review through tort 
claims of any executive policy decision. Protection to this extent, 
however, may be overly broad. Where policy has been established 
by statute or the Constitution, arguably no "room for policy judg- 
ment and decision" is left for officials to violate that law.l17 Since 
officials are not granted policymaking power or discretion to com- 
mit illegal acts, allowing suit for illegal acts of a discretionary 
nature through the Myers approach does not infringe on the deci- 
sionmaking power legally entrusted to public servants, and does 
not unduly impair separation of powers. 
An illustration of this principle may be found in the CIA 
mail-opening context. There, a legislative and constitutional pol- 
icy had already been established that mail not be opened and 
read without a warrant. The decision whether intelligence needs 
outweighed interests in privacy was for a magistrate to make, not 
CIA agents in New York City. There was no "room for policy 
judgment and decision" in this respect, and therefore the mail 
intercept project should not merit application of discretionary 
immunity. ll8 
The arguable legality and good faith tests would also corn- 
port with the separation of powers. Where the exact limits of the 
law and official authority are not clear, an officer's "attempt to 
define those limits must be [considered] part of the task corn- 
mitted to his judgment."llg So long as his interpretation is reason- 
able, it should be respected and protected by section 2680(a). 
114. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 87, 5 29.15, at 1662. 
115. James, supra note 11, at 651; see K. DAVIS, supra note 40, § 25.05, at 481. 
116. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 892-93. 
117. See Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. at 1359; Reynolds, supra note 
39, at 92. 
118. Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. at 1359. 
119. Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834. 
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B. Fostering Official Zeal 
I .  The need for immunity 
A reason often suggested for granting personal immunity to 
public officials is the chilling effect that potential liability may 
have on the ardor of public servants and on the willingness of 
persons to serve in such positions of respon~ibil i ty.~~~ Making the 
government liable for erroneous decisions of its employees alle- 
viates the problem to some extent, but it may still "unduly in- 
hibit the exercise of power. The officer's fear for his rating and 
his sense of responsibility to his principal may lead him to decide 
that a risk of a law suit is the greater evil."lzl The time commit- 
ments and potential loss of face in trials may thus act as a damp- 
ening force on official zea1.1z2 
The precise impact of potential government liability on em- 
ployees is not known,lz3 but if every decision were capable of 
generating a lawsuit, officials would tend to be overly cautious 
and, in some degree, to work in an atmosphere of fear and ten- 
sion. lz4 Effective government policymaking requres maximum 
freedom to plan, experiment, and negotiate.lz5 To this end, the 
discretionary function exception eliminates the threat of tort 
suits for policy decisions made within the official's authority, and 
thereby removes any stifling effect of potential government liabil- 
ity on official zeal, initiative, and effectiveness. 
In this respect, a Kiiskila 11 approach would maximize the 
zeal of public servants by removing the threat of suit for any act 
of a discretionary nature. But there is no need to promote the 
zealous performance of illegal activities. The important objective 
is that an officer be able to exercise fully his legal authority.lz6 
The Myers approach basically accords with this objective. For 
example, imposing government liability for the CIA mail open- 
120. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 319-20; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 
(2d Cir. 1949); Jaffe, supra note 87, at 223-24. 
121. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 224; see Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A 
Public Policy Prospectus, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463, 469 (1963). 
122. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121-22; see also Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 
136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352, 
358-60, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 246-48 (1968);, James, supra note 11, at 651-55; Note, The 
Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 IND. L.J. 121, 125- 
26 (1951). 
123. James, supra note 11, at 652. 
124. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; see Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 
56 YALE L.J. 534, 545 (1947). 
125. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 121; see James, supra note 11, at 652. 
126. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834. 
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ings would primarily deter illegal intelligence operations, but not 
unduly affect legitimate intelligence gathering. Just as imposing 
liability for negligent operational level decisions may encourage 
greater care on the part of government administrators,12' so allow- 
ing suit for clearly illegal discretionary acts may discourage viola- 
tions of the law.128 
Of course, officers should not be "charged with predicting the 
future course of constitutional law."129 Where the law is unclear 
there may be a danger that instead of merely avoiding illegal 
actions, officers will tend to do nothing at all. The arguable legal- 
ity and good faith tests may prevent this result by granting offi- 
cials a reasonable amount of discretion in gray areas of legal 
uncertainty and thus encourage full use of official authority.130 
2. Arguable legality versus good faith immunity 
The deterrent effects of the arguable legality and good faith 
tests are not identical. The good faith standard may have a 
greater dampening effect on official ardor than an arguable legal- 
ity test because a public servant may fear being "hard put to it 
to satisfy a jury of his good faith"lJ1 if a decision turns out to be 
erroneous. When liability depends on an official's subjective be- 
lief or motives, the danger of harassing suits with insubstantial 
bases may hinder impartial, decisive a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
The choice between the two tests depends on the amount of 
zeal and freedom it is desired that officials exercise in a particular 
area of the law.133 Perhaps the choice should be based on the kind 
of right infringed upon by the decision.'" For instance, good faith 
might be the appropriate standard for applying section 2680(a) 
where constitutional rights are involved; in nonconstitutional 
cases, arguable legality might be better.135 Alternatively, in the 
127. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 790-93, 447 P.2d 352, 358-60,73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 
246-48 (1968); James, supra note 11, at 651-53. 
128. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at 989-90. But see Goode, The Imposi- 
tion of Vicarious Liability to the Torts of Police Officers: Considerations of Policy, 10 
MELB. U.L. REV. 47, 52 (1975). 
129. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U S .  at 322 (quoting Pierson v .  Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 
( 1967)). 
130. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834. 
131. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)(referring to official immun- 
ity). 
132. See Remedies Against the United States, supra note 64, at 834. 
133. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 224-25. 
134. See id. at 219, 225-35; Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Func- 
tion Exception: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IOWA L. 
REV. 930, 976-78 (1971). 
135. This would be analogous to what appears to be the federal rule regarding per- 
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interest of simplicity, it may be more desirable that the same 
standard be adopted for all illegal acts. In any event, deciding 
which test to use is less important than recognizing some kind of 
immunity for acts of uncertain legality so as to allow maximum 
flexibility and freedom in government. 
C. Avoiding Judicial "Second- Guessing" of Discretionary Acts 
I t  has been suggested that the judiciary is not well suited to 
make political judgments more appropriately left to Congress and 
the executive branch.13The fault concept largely relied on in 
judicial decisionmaking presupposes the existence of an objective 
standard which may not exist in an area of competing legislative 
facts and theories.13' "The normal rules of liability cannot be 
applied easily to the unusual and gigantic tasks that few but the 
Government perform-tasks such as waging wars and building 
flood control projects."138 Using the Dalehite fact situation as an 
example, one commentator has concluded: 
The considerations are too complex. There are big questions of 
comparative cost, of alternative technique, and of what risks 
must be undergone in the public interest. An attempt to trans- 
mute in the alembic of negligence these competing considera- 
tions into a judgment of "reasonableness" emphasizes that the 
negligence concept has not been designed to handle such is- 
sues. 13g 
However, with regard to illegal acts of a discretionary nature, 
such complex policy judgments are generally not required by any 
of the three possible approaches. Under Kiiskila II, once a deci- 
sion is determined to be of a discretionary nature, no further 
judicial inquiry is necessary, and the case may be dismissed. The 
Myers approach requires only a determination of the legality of 
the act-something courts are equipped to do. If the law violated 
was meant to protect against the harm that occurred and the 
illegal act caused the harm, then liability may be imposed with- 
out the weighing and selection of competing policies.140 Similarly, 
sonal immunity of government officials. K.  DAVIS, supra note 87, $ 9  26.00, 26.00-1 to -4, 
at 573-91. 
136. See Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122. 
137. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 235-37; Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122; 56 B.U.L. REV. 
815,816-17 (1976); 41 WASH. L. REV. 340, 344-45 (1966). See Hendry v. United States, 418 
F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1969). 
138. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 122. 
139. Jaffe, supra note 87, at 236. 
140. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d at 1261. 
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resolution of the issues involved in application of the arguable 
legality and good faith tests-the existence of a good faith belief 
in the action, and/or the reasonableness of that belief-is well 
within judicial capabilities. Thus, the ability of courts to second- 
guess executive decisions should not affect the selection of a stan- 
dard for applying the discretionary function exception to illegal 
acts. 
D. Reventing Excessive Damages 
Government decisions necessarily affect large numbers of 
people and organizations; some of these decisions "conceivably 
could cause huge losses to millions of people."141 While section 
2680(a) was not enacted specifically to preclude potentially enor- 
mous liability resulting from discretionary activities, it "can, and 
inevitably will, serve that purpose."142 There is an interest in 
keeping the government relatively solvent, and large judgments 
could hamper vital pr0grams.l" Allowing imposition of liability 
in every case where government employees have exceeded the 
bounds of their authority might contravene this interest by in- 
creasing the potential for excessive recoveries. For example, in 
Birnbaum the trial court awarded $1,000 damages to each plain- 
tiff.'" Since the aggregate liability for the over 215,000 pieces of 
mail opened by the CIA during the twenty-year life of the mail 
intercept could reach great amounts,145 it may be the kind of 
result that the discretionary function exception was intended to 
prevent. 
On its face, Kiiskila II, with its broad construction of the 
discretionary function exception, would appear to be the best 
approach for avoiding excessive damages, and Myers, with its 
narrowing of government immunity, would appear to be the 
worst. However, the extent to which economic considerations af- 
fect the courts' application of section 2680(a) is not clear. One 
writer has suggested that "[a]lthough courts have not always 
adverted to this consideration, the results indicate that the possi- 
bility of an inordinate amount of liability to an indeterminate 
number of people has influenced their decisions."146 Another has 
-- 
141. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 123. 
142. Id. But see 7 HASTINGS L.J. 330, 332 (1956). 
143. Reynolds, supra note 39, at 123. 
144. 436 F. Supp. at 989. 
145. However, Wilson v. United States, No. 77-975 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1978), indi- 
cates that Judge Weinstein would generally limit damages to $1,000 per plaintiff rather 
than $1,000 per letter opened. 
146. 66 HARV. L. REV. 488, 494 (1953). 
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proposed that in cases where the potential applicability of discre- 
tionary immunity is not certain, consideration should be given to 
the interest of preventing "massive and widespread claims result- 
ing from a single governmental act. " 14' Apparently, although pre- 
vention of massive judgments may influence the courts in border- 
line cases, i t  is not usually a determinative factor. 
Whatever subjective desire Congress may have had to pr6- 
vent excessive damages by discretionary immunity must be bal- 
anced against congressional intent to compensate those injured 
by the wrongs of governmental employees,148 and the interest of 
keeping actions of administrators within the limits of their au- 
thority. Where damages from an illegal act are not speculative, 
the interest of compensating the injured and deterring unlawful 
decisions should outweigh the interest of restricting the govern- 
ment's potential liability. The discretionary function exception 
should not be a bar to recovery for injuries from clearly illegal 
acts. The balance may shift, however, when acts of arguable le- 
gality are considered. While the interest in compensating those 
harmed is just as great as with clearly illegal acts, the resulting 
deterrence of administrative wrongdoing may not be as effective 
or de~irab1e.I~~ The interests of allowing administrators some dis- 
cretion to reasonably determine the bounds of their authority and 
of avoiding potentially massive recoveries weigh heavily in favor 
of allowing some form of immunity for actions in the gray area of 
arguable legality. 
By enacting the discretionary function exception, Congress 
evidenced an intent that certain decisions entrusted to the nonju- 
dicial branches of government should not be subject to review by 
the courts. However, the split of judicial opinion in the CIA cases 
illustrates that the state of the law regarding illegal acts and the 
discretionary function exception is unclear. While two Supreme 
Court cases-Dalehite v. United States and Hatahley v. United 
States-shed light on the exception, neither case provides a defi- 
nitive precedent for resolving the issue. Lower courts have gener- 
ally taken two positions, either (1) that illegal acts are an abuse 
147. Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 
.IND. L.J. 121, 128-29 (1951). 
148. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955); 56 B.U.L. 
REV. 815, -817-18 (1976). 
149. Notes 129-35 and accompanying text supra. 
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of discretion protected by section 2680(a), or (2) that illegal acts 
are completely outside of the scope of the exception. 
The most desirable result would seem to be a middle posi- 
tion: that clearly illegal acts are outside the scope of the excep- 
tion, but those meeting either an  arguable legality or good faith 
test are protected by discretionary immunity. This position ade- 
quately promotes the separation of powers, encourages zealous 
performance of official functions, can be easily applied by the 
judiciary, and strikes a balance between the government's inter- 
est in avoiding potentially excessive liability and the victim's 
interest in receiving just compensation. 
David N. Heap 
